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This paper suggests to study service delivery networks by drawing on the theories of 
collaboration, coproduction, and networks combined. We introduce four dimensions of 
coproduction under ‘coproduction-oriented collaborations’. This framework allows us to ‘zoom 
in and zoom out’ when we study networks. Using the case method approach, the framework 
is applied to analyse four networks in Singapore. Findings suggest that network process, 
network structure, and characteristics of actors are crucial to a network’s performance. The 
paper also offer implications for practice that in certain contexts the usage of these concepts 
are for managerial effectiveness and not for enhancing democratic values. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Studies on collaboration, coproduction, and networks have taken off from different contexts. 
Most of the studies on coproduction have emerged out of the U.K. by European scholars in 
public administration, especially those who study the social services sector. On the other hand, 
in the U.S. especially at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University there is a fast growing set 
of scholarly writings on the concept of collaborations. IBM and other consultancy companies 
have also produced a number of manuals on how to manage collaborations. Alongside these 
two concepts, the studies on networks have grown significantly. It has caught attention of 
scholars from a variety of fields such as public administration, public policy, international 
relations, sociology, political science, and business administration.  Often the claims, 
hypotheses and research questions pertaining to these three concepts either overlap or are 
closely related. There is very little scholarly work that deliberately studies these concepts 
together. Exceptions are such as Bode’s study of co-governance within networks (Bode, 2006) 
and Brandsen and van Hout’s study of co-management in public service networks (Brandsen 
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& Hout, 2006). This paper aims to suggest a common framework that incorporates all three 
strands of literature that will enable managers to better understand the setup, behaviors, and 
effectiveness of complex public service delivery systems.   
In this paper, we begin by identifying definitions and key arguments from the existing 
literature. Then we introduce our take on one way to converge the three concepts - how we 
can link them into one common framework for analysis. Next we analyse four networks in 
Singapore by using the proposed framework. From the analysis we draw implications for 
theory and practice. This study is important not only because it explicitly bridges the concepts 
but also it is the first of its kind from Asia and Singapore in particular, where social welfare is 
not the government’s top priority and where civic life is often thought to be restricted. 
Singapore’s context makes this case more relevant to many other countries compared to 
highly mature democratic societies in Europe and the U.S.  
 




Collaboration or the study of collaborative management is defined as ‘a concept that 
describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to 
solve problems that cannot be solved or solved easily by single organizations. Collaborative 
means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and in multi-
sector and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity and can 
include the public’ (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p.4). The main difference between the original 
ideas of collaboration and coproduction involves how the former focuses on organizational-
level, while the latter focuses on individual-level (i.e. citizens and professionals). Also the latter 
focuses on the fact that one person or organization can simultaneously be both the producer 
and consumer of service.  Compared to the definition of coproduction and networks, the 
concept of collaborative management is overarching. It covers all types of relationships 
between entities in to get things done in the public sector. These entities are from public, 
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private and non-profit sectors combinded. Some might insist that coproduction and networks 
be categorized under this large rubric of collaboration. 
Collaborative management places emphasis on participatory processes that enable 
citizens to better influence the actions of governance networks. It is grounded in normative 
foundation of democratic participation and deliberation (Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2011, p. 196). 
Similar to coproduction, collaboration is a dynamic and emergent process rather than a static 
condition (Gray & Wood, 1991; Selden, Sowa, & Sanfort, 2002; Bingham & O’ Leary, 2008). 
Collaborative governance includes vertical collaborations (across government bodies) and 
horizontal collaborations (across organizational and sectoral boundaries) (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003). Agranoff and McGuire suggest that collaboration is about selecting actors 
and resources, shaping the network, and developing ways to cope with strategic and 
operational complexity (2003, p.34). 
Collaborative management is paradoxical in that it requires managers to be autonomous 
yet interdependent, and they need to be participative and authoritative at the same time 
(O’Leary & Bingham, 2007). It is distinguishable from cooperation and coordination (Gray & 
Wood, 1991; Bryson & Crosby, 2008). Cooperation is less formal, involves sharing information 
and maybe short term. It involves reciprocities, exchanges of resources without necessarily 
having mutual goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Coordination is the orchestration of 
organizations toward a particular goal that is longer-term that provides shared rewards. 
Collaboration is a closer relationship between the parties where new structures emerge and 
social and organizational capital is built (Bingham, 2011). Collaboration involves a willingness 
of parties and stakeholders involved to enhance one another’s capacity for mutual benefit. 
The parties share risks, responsibilities and rewards, invest substantial time, share common 
turf and have high levels of trust (Himmelman, 2001). Collaboration can be analogised as 
cooperating for a mutual goal , achieving individual ends with an additional outcome that is 
shared separate from the individual ends (e.g. better social outcomes, better coordination of 





The idea of coproduction can be traced back to Elinor Ostrom’s (1973) study of the Chicago 
police force in the 1973. Since then the idea has been picked up and studied by scholars 
around the world (e.g. Whitaker, 1980; Parks, Baker, Kiser, & Oakerson, 1981; Ostrom, 1996; 
Alford, 2002; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Prentice, 2006; Bovaird, 2007; V. Pestoff & Brandsen, 
2009; V. A. Pestoff, Brandsen, & Verschuere, 2012). Alford defines coproduction as the 
“Involvement of citizens, clients, consumers, volunteers and/or community organizations in 
producing public services as well as consuming or otherwise benefiting from them” (Alford, 
1998:128).  We recognize that coproduction is not a steady state but a process or set of actions 
by actors involved. Coproduction is not simply a platform for people's views. Rather, it is as a 
venue where non-government organizations and individuals, together with public service 
professionals, can utilize their practical skills to provide a public service and consume its 
benefits relevant to them. In the beginning scholars focused on individuals as active citizens 
who take part in coproduction but the concept has evolved to also include organization level 
of relationships as well (e.g. Pestoff & Brandsen, 2009).  
That said there are many forms of coproduction and distinct concepts identified in the 
literature. There can be coproduction in different content areas such as economics, politics 
and service specific areas (Pestoff, 2009). There can also be various forms of coproduction in 
terms of processes in service planning, design, and management or a more direct role in 
service delivery (Bovaird, 2007; Joshi & Moore, 2004). It can also take place in the monitoring 
and evaluation stages of programs. 
As clearly segmented by Pestoff and Brandsen (2009), coproduction can also be further 
segregated into three different but related concepts. A sub-concept is Co-governance, an 
arrangement that allows the third sector to participate in the planning and delivery of the 
service formerly or normally produced by public service professionals. There is also Co-
management where third sector organizations produce services in collaboration with 
government agencies. A third sub-concept, titled as the narrower definition of co-production, 
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would be the arrangement where individual citizens produce their own services in full or part 
with public service professionals. This could include a community policing service or 
environmental conservation exercise where citizens play an active role in the implementation.  
Various conditions have been identified or hypothesized to promote and enable 
coproduction. Pestoff (2009) suggests that different forms of coproduction result from different 
forms of welfare regimes and policies in different sectors. Flexibility of coproduction templates 
is also argued to enable coproduction to be more successful. Bovaird (2007) suggests that 
the willingness of politicians to contest the role of professionals and place more trust in 
decisions made by users and communities also enables coproduction. Third sector 
involvement also seems to promote participation from non-service providers on the basis that 
they provide democratization and innovation. However, there is little empirical evidence to 
suggest the former (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2009).  
Coproduction can have many limitations. The more able and resourceful people may 
dominate proceedings of coproduction. There might also be resistance from professionals to 
let go of their former powers (Bovaird, 2007). However, most importantly, it dilutes public 
accountability on the expected outcomes of the affected policy. Governments may start 
shifting blame and no longer take sole responsibility for any policy failure. 
Despite the limitations, coproduction has many obvious benefits. It can be therapeutic as 
well as diagnostic (Bovaird, 2007).  Through coproduction, clients can explore mechanisms 
for active experience of services rather than simply assuming professionals should perform a 
service on users. It also mobilizes community resources otherwise not available to deal with 
public issues. Needham (2008) showed through her case study of social housing in UK how 
coproduction can create peer pressure for residents to cooperate and comply with regulations. 
Coproduction can also improve efficiency, through building commitment and trust that reduces 
irrational hostilities, as well as putting in mechanisms to enhance user accountability (Ostrom, 
1996). Former service providers can also transform their role to that of a facilitator of platforms 
and networks, freeing up manpower and workload (Leadbeater, 2004:24). 
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Citizens, clients, and organizations have certain incentives to coproduce. As hypothesized 
by Alford (2002), the incentives for co-producers to coproduce include tangible benefits such 
as money, goods, or services. Tangible benefits however, are neither sufficient nor necessary 
incentives in the context of more complex co-productive work. Alford (2002) suggests that 
nonmaterial rewards that focus on the intrinsic, solidary, and expressive needs of the co-
producer are vital when the value of the coproduction exercise is group or public in nature. 
 
Networks 
There has been a proliferal of studies on how to manage networks. European scholars as well 
as American-based scholars have contributed to its development (e.g. Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997; Bogason & Toonen, 1998; Toonen, 1998; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Brandsen & Hout, 2006; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2011). Networks are 
“structures involving multiple nodes—individuals, agencies, or organizations—with multiple 
linkages” (McGuire, 2006). Network structures are typically inter-sectoral, intergovernmental, 
and based functionally in a specific policy or policy area (McGuire, 2006). No unit is “merely 
the formal subordinate of another in a networked setting” (O’Toole, 1997). Networks are an 
alternative form to hierarchy and free market, reason being that while flexible networks have 
some level of stability (in terms of membership) and is not simply ad-hoc  (Newig, Gunther, & 
Pahl-Wostl, 2010). As compared to organizations, network ties are multi-dimensional. This 
includes "authority bonds, exchange relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all 
within a single multi-unit structure" (O’Toole, 1997). 
1) Functions of Networks 
 
There are a few key aspects of networks we find crucial to our study. These are the actor 
characteristics, network processes, and structure, which affect a network's values and 
functions. Most networks hold the functions of learning, coordination, and building social 
capital to a certain degree. Learning is a crucial element in a collaborative network especially 
when it is set up to deal with a complex problem characterised by unpredictable systems 
8 
 
dynamics, a lack of knowledge on the effects of interventions as well as societal conflicts about 
appropriateness of interventions (Newig, Gunther, & Pahl-Wostl, 2010). 
In general, learning can be simply cognitive or includes behavioural change. It can be 
collective or individual, and can be single or double looped (Newig, Gunther, & Pahl-Wostl, 
2010; Argyris, 1982). Collective learning involves a change of shared mental models among 
members of a group or network. This often implies changes in social structure changes – 
which involve changes in institutional structure (informal or formal norms) and/or relational 
structure (relations between actors). A single loop form of learning occurs when one detects 
a mismatch between desired goals and the achieved results of an action. Their errors are 
corrected without changing their underlying values and remains within accepted routines. 
Double loop learning on the other hand, leads to a change of a person's underlying paradigm. 
This requires new rules of conduct, routines, and reflection on the goals themselves as well 
as interrelations between network members. The ability to learn that involves modifying the 
organizational learning system itself is called ‘deutero learning’ (Argyris & Schon, 1996).  
Social capital can be defined as enduring structure of relationships that enables the 
transmission of information and knowledge (Putnam 2000; Singh & Prakash, 2010: Jones et 
al, 1997). Building social capital for a society can be considered a form of resource that aids 
in achieving and maintaining various social outcomes (Putnam 2000; Field 2008). For 
networks, building social capital specifically contributes to collective action by increasing 
potential costs to defectors that fosters norms of reciprocity (Putnam, 2000). Depending on 
the makeup of the network, bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) forms of social capital 
is formed (Putnam 2000;  Henry, Lubell, & McCoy, 2010). Bonding social capital is created by 
linking people with similar values, beliefs or status together, whereas bridging social capital is 
created by linking people with dissimilar values together. This acts as template for future 
cooperation and affects the productivity of individuals and groups. 
2) Actor Characteristics 
 
Different characteristics of members of a network affect the fore-mentioned functions. 
Characteristics include the incentives of network members to participate. Members of a 
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network tend to be incentivised to participate in a network when the resources are provided in 
terms of finance and technical expertise.  However, activity levels (in terms of variety of 
activities and amount of time contributed) are highest when network fulfils political interests of 
members and have goals similar to theirs (Fleishman, 2009). Participation also increases if 
stakeholders perceive achievement of their goals to be dependent on cooperation from other 
stakeholders (Fleishman, 2009). 
Participant’s objectives and goals from the network can include gaining resources for 
programmes, enhancing organisational legitimacy through contacts, reputation, future 
contracts, and reducing transaction costs – through only collaborating with trusted partners. 
Graddy and Chen (2009) suggest that when organisations focus on differing goals, different 
results occur. Other actor attributes include the impact of network on the participants as well 
as prior relationship to other participants.  
3) Network Values 
Network values are key towards achieving the functions of networks. Three interrelated, key 
values have come across various literatures of networks and collaborations. First, trust is key 
as it enables coordination and acceptance of roles in any forms of networks or collaborations. 
Trust can be an instrumental or an intrinsic value. Trust is ultimately a matter of risk taking 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005) that can be built by taking calculated bets. Trust can also be built 
by sharing information and knowledge, demonstrating competency, good intentions, and 
follow through (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Some academics argue that if prehistory 
between stakeholders is highly antagonistic, policy makers/stakeholders should budget time 
for effective remedial trust building. If not, they should not embark on a collaborative strategy 
(Huxham, 2005; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Collaborations are 
also more likely to be successful when trust building efforts are continuous (Bryson, Crosby, 
& Stone, 2006) rather than one-off.  
Commitment to the collaboration process is also key in networks. Even in collaborative 
efforts that are mandated, achieving buy-in is still an essential aspect of the collaborative 
process (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Four elements of “power” are crucial towards this achievement 
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of "buy-in" (Agranoff, 2006). First, is the "champion" - a visible, powerful, and prestigious public 
agency head or non-profit senior executive who organizes or sustains the network. The 
involvement of a champion helps signal to and incentivise others in the field to join in the 
network. Second, is the political core which comprises primary participating department heads 
from various public agencies. Being part of the governance structure, this gives participants 
the message that the network is important to be involved with. Third, is the technical core 
within the network which consists of experts, workgroup activists who know most about a 
particular topic. These individuals hold considerable persuasion power and are key towards 
generating buy-in. Last but not least, the administration core who are the ones that staff and 
organize the logistics of such networks. Their handling of the administration of the network 
also holds certain amount of power. 
The third value within a network is shared understanding of the issue. Similar to trust and 
commitment, shared understanding is a value that has to be created. This value helps 
prevents miscommunication and misdirection of efforts (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Shared 
understanding as a value is especially important when policy issues are complex and 
stakeholders hold differing notions of the causes of the problem.  
4) Network Processes and Structure 
Network processes impact values and functions of networks. Clear ground rules and process 
transparency help improve coordination processes within a network (Ansell & Gash, 2007). 
The former is especially important to help understand each other’s perspectives if parties are 
hostile to each other (Needham, 2008). Face to face dialogue is more than just medium of 
negotiation. It is also a process of building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding, and 
commitment to the process. But it is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one (Ansell & Gash, 
2007). “Small wins” or immediate outcomes are critical process outcomes essential for building 
the momentum that can lead to successful collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007). If prior 




Network structures affect the values and resulting functions of networks. There are two 
different forms of structures to look at in networks, its general shape as well as governance 
structure. Some main components of general network structure can be described from the 
following terms derived from network sciences. 
Network centrality measures how “uneven” centrality is distributed in a network. Centrality 
measures can be determined by degree among many other ways, i.e. the number of direct 
connections a node has. A highly centralised network is observed when it is dominated by one 
or a few very highly connected nodes (Prell, 2012). When removed, the network quickly 
fragments into unconnected sub-networks A network's overall centrality can be measured by 
deducting from the number of links a member with highest degree centrality has with the 
number of links the member with the lowest centrality has. Centralised networks tend to 
provide consensus on values and goals. It transmits information smoothly. Sandstrom and 
Carlsson (2008) found efficient performance of networks to be correlated with higher degrees 
of network closure (Highly centralized and dense networks). 
The strength of ties in a network also affects network processes and functions. Strength 
of ties depend on the combination of time, emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confiding), 
and reciprocal services that characterize the tie (Granovetter, 1973:1361). As shown by Janis 
(1982) in his seminal work Groupthink, strong ties may seem beneficial for collaboration but it 
takes time to build and can lead to a closed view of the world when they are too strong (Janis 
1982). Weak ties on the other hand take less time to build and are more flexible to incorporate 
alternative views, linking network members with actors outside boundaries of the network 
(Messner, 1995). It however tends not to promote intensive exchange of arguments and 
deliberation (Newig, Gunther, & Pahl-Wostl, 2010). 
Network Density, measured by dividing the number of relations in a network by the 
maximum possible number of relations, can affect how a network operates. Denser networks 
can improve the transmission of information since there are many channels of information 
(Abrahamson & Rosenkopf 1997, Valente 2005) and create more deliberation opportunities 
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for networks. However, denser networks tend to be less able to adapt to fundamental change 
such as restructuring the network (Gargiulo & Benassi 2000). 
5) Governance Structures 
 
There are various ways to govern a network. Depending on the initial conditions and purposes 
of a network, different governance structures can optimise the functioning of a network 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008), As described by Milward and Provan (2006), there are three different 
forms of governance structure in a network which can be used optimally depending on the 
circumstances. Shared governance, where members of a network share governance 
responsibilities, can be used when there is a high density of trust (high level of trust between 
all members of the network) with few participants (no more than 6 organisation reps), high 
level of goal consensus with a low need for network-level competencies.  
Lead organisation governance, where the lead agency takes charge of governance and 
coordination, can be used when there is a low density of trust (low level of trust between all 
members of the network with trust placed only on certain members of the network) with 
moderate number of participants, moderate level of goal consensus with a moderate need for 
network-level competencies. Network Administrative Organization (NAO) governance, where 
a neutral party manages and coordinates a network, is used when there is moderate density 
of trust (moderate level of trust between all members of the network with trust placed only on 
certain members of the network) with moderate to many participants, moderately high level of 
goal consensus with a high need for network-level competencies.  
 
CONVERGENCE OF THEORIES  
 
We propose to combine the above concepts of networks, collaboration and coproduction in a 
converged framework. It is possible that coproduction and networks exist indendependently 
of each other. Some networks do not have coproduction and some coproduction 
arrangements will not be part of any network. Also some collaborations might not be in network 
form and might not have coproduction processes. However we argue that increasingly in 
public service delivery networks, where the main goal is to provide public service or goods it 
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would be common to find collaborations and coproduction. Furthermore, in collaboration 
among organizational-level partners there can be components of coproduction with individuals 
associated with organizations that are part of the collaboration. We also advocate that vice 
versa is true, which is that most coproduction processes are usually part of a larger set of 
relations within a public service delivery network. In order to be able to see and study these 
relationships clearly the researcher must either ‘zoom in or zoom out’ when necessary. 
 
<Insert Diagram 1> 
 
 
We adapted Brandsen and Pestoff's (2006) framework to allow us a clearer understanding 
of what we are analysing. Diagram 1 shows how we have segmented Coproduction-oriented 
Collaborations into four different quadrants. Each quadrant depends on who is in involved in 
the relationship (spectrum of individuals to organizations) and at which stage of the policy 
process the relationship is for. We have used the three types of coproduction introduced by 
Brandsen and Pestoff and have added a new dimension called ‘co-consultation’. Co-
consultation refers to the process where individuals as citizens, experts or stakeholders are of 
equal status with professionals in the planning process of public services. i  We think it is 
clearer to use the term ‘coproduction-oriented collaborations’ as an umbrella concept to cover 
all the four models of possible relationships between organizations, individuals, planning, and 
production.  
Using the framework in diagram 2, we seek to understand how policy context, such as the 
motivations of NGOs as well as the complexity of the policy, affect collaborations.  We also 
want to understand how network processes and structures impact on the network functions, 
which affect the coproduction process. Third, we try to identify the key values of a network and 
ways to build it. Last, we seek to pick out key management skills and tasks to manage a 
network. 
 





This way to view networks and various types of collaboration practices allows us to take 
into account all aspects of the public service network and to always be able to ‘zoom in or 
zoom out’ when investigating relationships among organizations and between organizations 
and individuals in the pursuit of public goods and services. This next section describes 
Singapore’s background, followed by concrete discussions the four networks that we have 
applied this framework to.  
 
SINGAPORE’S BACKGROUND  
 
The People’s Action Party, the ruling party of the Singapore government, has dominated 
Singapore politics for 49 years as a one-party government since its independence in 1965. 
Largely lauded for its development policies, it has brought forth unprecedented income growth 
and improvement of living standards for its people for the past forty years. This economic 
success came on the back of the "work for rewards, reward for work" principle of governance 
(Lee, 2004), where social welfare was eschewed and self-reliance supported so as to promote 
the work ethic and prevent free-riders. The economic policies together with a socially 
conservative philosophy enabled the government to reach living standards comparable to 
western democracies without the public debt issues. 
Development of civil societies in Singapore, however, did not resemble that of western 
democracies. Here, civil societies are more "civic" than "civil" with the government restraining 
the formation of politically based civil groups and emphasizing citizenship on civic and national 
duty rather than on individual rights (Chong, 2005). This has led to a civil society that is largely 
made up of apolitical, non-critical welfare groups, also known as Voluntary Welfare 
Organizations (VWOs) that provide social services for the poor and needy. Created by law, 
these VWOs can have charity status allowing them tax exemptions.  
Despite limitations on individual rights, the number of non-profit organizations in Singapore 
has been on a rise in recent years. At present, there are about 130 local and international non-
profit organisations in Singapore, which comprises inter-governmental organisations, non-
government organisations with a social, humanitarian or environmental focus, industry 
15 
 
associations, philanthropic foundations, think tanks, and organizations linked to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programs. This number itself has tripled since 2005 (Economic 
Development Board, 2012). 
Interestingly when it comes to welfare, despite repeatedly emphasizing that Singapore is 
not a welfare state, the government does heavily intervene in social welfare issues. There are 
many social programs that aim to help the weaker and less advantaged groups. The 
government created the Many Helping Hands (MHH) approach based on the principle that 
various agencies, including government, the community and families, work together in 
partnership to tackle social issues in Singapore. MHH's philosophy is such that everyone in 
society should try to be self-reliant. In times of need, the individual should first seek his or her 
family's help. Failing which, the second line of help should be that of the VWOs, while the 
government should be the last resort. This philosophy is behind many of the network initiatives 
created by government to coordinate social services.  
So despite seemingly devolving its social responsibilities to the VWOs, the Singapore 
government plays a large role in the social sector. Not only does it fund the VWOs substantially 
- the government provides around one third of funds VWOs receives - it continues to play a 
central part in the coordination, enabling, and planning of social services for the state as a 
whole. This includes forming networks with VWOs, private sector as well as various 
government agencies to provide certain social services. In this study we investigate how the 
Singapore government utilizes collaboration, networks, and coproduction in the provision of 




There are a few approaches to studying and defining networks (Newman, 2012; Prell, 2012; 
Laumann et al., 1989; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Knoke & Yang, 2008). The realist approach 
allows actors to define the boundary. It uses several sampling methods such as snowball 
sampling, fixed list selection, expanding selection, and the more mathematical K-core method 
(Doreian & Woodard, 1992; Knoke & Yang, 2008: Yang and Hexmoor, 2004). In contrast, the 
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nominalist approach relies on theoretical or attributes of actors such as their membership in a 
formal organisation as justifications of the researcher to define the network boundary. Lastly, 
there is the event-based approach where the network boundary is drawn by examining actors 
who participated in a defined set of activities at a specific time and place (Knoke & Yang, 2008: 
Marsden, 2005).  
     With the aim to explore how the proposed framework can be applied to study formal 
networks in Singapore, we have adopted the nominalist approach, using interviews as the 
main mode of data collection, supplemented by the archival method for the network analysis. 
Archival method is the use of available information to gather data such as newspapers, 
historical texts, minutes of meetings (Prell, 2012). The objective of the study was to study how 
organisations coproduce a programme or policy. It would not be meaningful to use the realist 
approach, which may lead to studying of phenomena outside of formal partnerships. We also 
concluded that interviews are more efficient than direct observation and more reliable than 
surveys. Following Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin’s (2009) case study approach we 
minimized the possibility of biasedness through using semi-structured interviews, archival 
data, and having a framework developed in the early stage of the research.  
     Data collection took place April 2012 to July 2012. In the initial stage we scanned official 
websites and news reports published between 2010-2012 by using key words such as 
networks, collaborations, and public-private partnerships. In total we were able to identify 24 
networks and collaborations.ii Of the 24 we selected ten networks that had a clear presence. 
We judged this by preliminary phoning the agencies to ask about the network’s activities and 
goals and asked them to fill in a simple online survey on the description of their network.iii  We 
then narrowed down the number of networks to do in-depth study by selecting from the ten 
those that displayed stability, in other words were in operation for more than one year and had 
a core team of people running the network, and willingness to take part in the study.  
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Of the four that we finally selected, three are in the social services sector and one is in the 
environmental sector. This proportion reflects the government policy to support VWOs in social 
services sector more than other sectors. The networks are 1) The National Family Violence 
Networking System (NFVNS); 2) Community Action for the Rehabilitation of Ex-Offenders 
(CARE); 3) The Response, Early Assessment for Community Mental Health (REACH); 4) 
Community in Bloom (CIB). We then interviewed the selected network actors to understand 
the nature of their networks. The people we interviewed include public managers, volunteers, 
and the VWO officials.  Aside from the rich interviews, we also directly observed some of the 
networks’ projects and used documents produced by the networks to form our analysis.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES 
 
The National Family Violence Networking System (NFVNS) 
Responding to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) that Singapore ratified in 1995, the National Family Violence Networking 
System (NFVNS) was launched in 1996. Prior to this, a prominent civil society organization, 
the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) first launched its campaign 
against domestic violence in 1985. Together with the Singapore Association of Women’s 
Lawyers (SAWL) and the Society Against Family Violence (SAFV), talks, advertisements, 
forums, support groups, and other initiatives were launched to raise awareness about 
domestic violence in Singapore.  In 1994, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Community 
Development, Ministry of Health, and the Singapore Council of Women’s Organisations 
launched an Inter-Ministerial Working Group to improve the management of violence between 
spouses. Over time, the NFVNS would grow into a system that sought to provide victims of 
family violence multiple points through which they could access help. 
     This led to an evolution in the framework for domestic violence management including the 
1996 Women’s Charter and the 1997 legislation of Family Violence.  Responsibility for the 
oversight of policy planning and strategic management of family violence in Singapore lies 
with the Family Violence Dialogue Group (FVDG), which is jointly chaired by the Ministry of 
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Community Development, Youth, and Sports (MCYS) iv  and the Singapore Police Force 
(SPF).  The provision of services to victims of family violence is organized geographically via 
6 Regional Family Violence Working Groups (FVWG). These FVWGs link the police, hospitals, 
schools, social service agencies, the Courts and MCYS for closer collaboration via the Case 
Management Framework.  
Community Action for the Rehabilitation of Ex-Offenders (CARE) 
Co-chaired by Prisons and Singapore Corporation of Rehabilitative Enterprises (SCORE), the 
CARE Network was set up in 2000 to improve the effectiveness of the efforts of different 
agencies involved in rehabilitative works for ex-offenders in Singapore. It is also the first formal 
structure that brings community and government agencies together to provide in-care to 
aftercare services to the ex-offenders. Currently the network consists of 8 agencies: Singapore 
Corporation of Rehabilitative Enterprises (SCORE), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Ministry 
of Community Youth and Sports (MCYS), Prisons, National Council of Social Services 
(NCSS), Industrial & Services Co-operative Society Ltd (ISCOS), Singapore Aftercare 
Association (SACA) and Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association (SANA). Through the alliance, 
the CARE Network aims to pool resources and co-ordinate activities to achieve synergy in 
engaging the community in rehabilitation as well as develop rehabilitative initiatives. This is 
done through regular meetings and the Case Management Framework.  
Community in Bloom (CIB) 
 
Singapore’s concept of Garden City began as early as 1960s. Some government agencies 
saw the natural environment as crucial for Singapore: they aspired to make Singapore a model 
for managing urban environments. For 40 years the government single-handedly managed 
green space. Only in 2004 did the government decide to include citizens – to enhance their 
well-being and sense of ownership of public space. National Parks or NParks is the champion 
public agency that has collaborated with other organizations to provide seamless green space 
in the city. One of their main partners is an NGO known as Nature Society. They also rely 
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heavily on expert individuals who are passionate about the environment (e.g. butterfly, hornbill, 
spider experts).  
Recently, Singapore has evolved its mission to creating a City in a Garden. To support 
that, the Community in Bloom (CIB) program was launched in 2005 by the NParks in 
collaboration with partners including Town Councils, Housing Development Board, People’s 
Association, National Library Board, other non-governmental organisations as well as the 
private sector. These organisations provide a range of support including land use, garden set-
up, grassroots liaison, gardening talks and other initiatives. The CIB aims to foster a gardening 
culture among the community by helping to facilitate and guide residents, students and 
workers in Singapore to set up and sustain their community gardening projects. Besides from 
taking care of the plants, these plant lovers also meet up regularly to share gardening tips and 
plant specimens as well as organize visits to other gardens and meeting with like-minded 
people to exchange ideas and experience. CIB hopes to link-up all gardeners and community 
gardening groups into a self-sustaining National Gardening Movement. There are currently 
over 400 community gardens in Singapore.   
 
The Response, Early Assessment for Community Mental Health (REACH) 
 
REACH program was formed in 2007 with the main objective of early intervention for children 
with mental health conditions such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder or various forms 
of anxiety disorders. Prior to this initiative a substantial proportion of the people rather rely on 
religious rituals or traditional medicines than go to the psychiatrist due to stigma issues 
(Chong, 2007). This led to a mental health system that had a huge gap between treating 
patients with mental health conditions and the estimated number of patients in the population 
(Woo et al., 2007). Spearhead by mental health professionals and administrative staffs from 
three public hospitals, the REACH team partners with schools all over Singapore to identify 
children with possible mental health conditions. The team also works with VWOs to help 
children who are not in School. REACH also works with General Practitioners (GPs) to provide 
medication to patients at clinics near their homes without the need for them to go to the central 
20 
 
hospital. The REACH team's goals are quite clear in that they want to better intervene in a 
child's mental condition before it becomes more serious. Backed by the government, the 
REACH team is well resourced both in manpower as well as funds in seeking to achieve these 
goals.  
 




APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK  
 
We found components of collaboration and coproduction in all four networks. The diagram 
below depicts the network structure, which is made up of collaborations, including individual-
level co-production processes. 
 
<Insert Diagram 3> 
 
 
Key characteristics of these cases are the following. First, all four networks are led by 
government. Second, most VWOs and community groups rely on government funding. Third, 
certain agencies such as MCYS, Prisons, and NParks are very open to working with VWOs 
and citizens to provide services. Collaborations are often initiated by government agencies. 
Agencies are also very open to policy changes and operating procedures based on experience 
and recommendations from the ground. Fourth, the government plays a key role in nurturing 
certain VWOs to grow and strengthen such as the setup of VWOS in REACH and of TRANS 
for elderly protection in NFVNS. Lastly, government has creatively included VWOs and civic 
leaders into formal government circles and structure such as nomination to chair committees 
and advisory boards.  
In the following section, three factors are analysed: characteristics of actors; network 
structure; and network process in congruent with the implications towards collaboration and 
coproduction. We argue that all three factors affect each other, which in turn affect the quality 





1) Characteristics of Actors  
 
There are three organizational or individual characteristics that affect collaborations within the 
networks. First is the level of resource dependency. In all four networks it is clear that 
Singapore’s government agencies are very well funded. None of the public agencies needed 
to rely on VWOs or private sector for funding. On the other hand, some VWOs and community 
groups, especially those in NFVNS and CARE do rely on government funding for their 
operations. In CARE, the two VWOs heavily rely on NCSS for funding. They are compensated 
based on the Case Management Framework. Thus each ex-offender helped is translated into 
reimbursable expenditure by the NGO. Similarly, in NFVNS where the two main social service 
agencies - the Centre for Promoting Alternatives to Violence (PAVe) and the TRANS Center, 
which specializes in elder protection work – rely on MCYS for funding for each case they 
handle. NFVNS also includes the community-based Family Service Centers (FSCs) that are 
the nodes for help, counseling, casework intervention, financial assistance, and support 
groups for families. These centers are an arm of the government for they rely mostly on direct 
government funding. This dependency can impede these VWO members of the network to 
agree in expanding membership to other VWOs for fear that they will lose their funding. This 
dependency has also led some VWOs to expand their goals to accommodate government 
agency goals. One example is ISCOS in the CARE network. However, this dependency allows 
the government to ensure goals between partners are always aligned. In the case of REACH 
where private clinics are not reliant on government funding, it has been more difficult to get 
them on board in the network.  
In the case of CIB, there were partners who were not dependent on government funding 
at all. Yet, they were fully supportive of the network goals as they were often already 
passionate about gardening and were more willing to fork out funding from their organizations 
or personal pockets. These gardening groups are truly coproducing with government because 
they are sharing the cost of production and also the direct consumers or beneficiaries of the 
gardens. Two gardens investigated actually generated earnings for the individual members of 
the garden groups. One company used gardening as part of their strategy to enhance work-
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life balance and contributions back to the environment. Thus the company took out funding 
from their CSR program. Individuals who take part in the gardening program are also resource 
persons for NParks. Some have more expertise than NParks officials and they are often asked 
to give talks and conduct trainings, which they are happy to do. These cases show that as 
long as there is goal congruency, funding dependency does not matter.  
Second characteristic of actors analysed is the level of goal congruence. As long as goals 
are congruent actors in the network are able to work together. Often goals are shaped along 
the way as members know each other better and can see how they can help each other 
achieve their goals. REACH for example is successful with schools because early detection 
of mental disorders in children also helps the schools to achieve their KPI of Desired 
Outcomes of Education which includes the ability to judge right from wrong (Ministry of 
Education, 2012). By working with schools, REACH also reaches widely to children in 
Singapore. As for CARE network, all the actors’ goals were congruent because the network 
was setup only by the agencies that are involved in helping ex-offenders. It was not about 
reshaping each other’s goals to align. In contrast, NFVNS’s actors were quite diverse ranging 
from police, social workers, courts, hospitals, to VWOs. But throughout the years of working 
together, their goals have become congruent which is to help the victims and minimize 
domestic violence in Singapore. In addition, where there were gaps in the VWOs, the 
government stepped in to build capacity. An example was how MCYS strategically built 
counseling capacities for 40 social service organizations. These organizations now shoulder 
the burden with MCYS to provide counseling to families on domestic violence. Thus their goals 
naturally become aligned with government. 
Third characteristic analysed is the existence of leaders or champions within the 
organization who are willing to collaborate. In CIB for example, aside from NParks’ leading 
public manager who oversees the entire gardening network, there are a handful of private 
individuals who act as ambassadors for the cause. They hold the expertise and they volunteer 
their time to train others, which along the way helps to expand the network. NParks also has 
a passionate leader at the director level to drive the overall network.  NFVNS makes the effort 
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to compliment officers who have successfully handled cases. This has helped built collective 
leadership on the ground among regional actors. CARE and NFVNS are both under the same 
ministry. The leadership within this ministry has evolved as they went through the experiences 
of the two networks. This openness to collaborate is probably uneven between other ministries 
and is uneven within NParks and MCYS as well. However, Singapore has the whole-of-
government approach, where inter-agency coordination is emphasized and encouraged. 
Politicians were often the ones pushing agencies to collaborate more with the private and non-
profit sectors. Case in point is NParks’ CIB, which started only because a political leader asked 
NParks to rethink how they work and stop doing things top-down. In sum, leadership in 
networks can come from the highest level of government to the ground level of individual 
experts who are passionate. The champions can also emerge from clients who have 
successfully coproduced the service such as those who have overcome domestic violence 
problems.  
 
2) Network Structure 
 
The network structure is an important factor that determines actors’ behavior, network 
processes and the quality collaboration and coproduction. We will focus on power relations, 
level of centralization, and level of density to explore the network structure. First, we found 
that networks that have clear KPIs set by the government or the network itself, such as CARE 
(ex. ex-offenders find a job within 6 months) will be more centralized. Indicators of network 
centralization include having a network secretariat, fixed network membership, closed 
meetings, and usually the network does not change much over time.  
CARE has fixed actors in the network with predictable roles. VWOs are more or less 
service providers alongside the government agencies. Targeting only ex-offenders and their 
family, the network does not pan out because the relationship is quite tight between existing 
members. CARE monitors its KPIs through the Case Management approach since 2001. 
Learning from the CARE network, the NCSS issued guidelines in 2004 for case management 
for a variety of cases and not only for ex-offenders. The cases include multi-stressed families, 
24 
 
post suicide and crisis cases, family violence cases, youth-at-risk, people with disabilities, 
people with HIV/AIDS, and elderly with multiple needs. Coordinated and integrated services 
among many agencies and community groups are catered for clients’ needs.  
We consider this case management approach as a form of coproduction. There are five 
stages of the case management service. In the assessment stage the case manager together 
with the client analyses and prioritizes information to identify goals of the client. Clients have 
full freedom of choice and decision-making. The purpose is also to tap on clients’ capacities 
and social networks. The case manager and the client would then make an Individual Care 
Plan (ICP) with close monitoring from case manager on the implementation. In this scenario, 
the case manager is not just a service provider but rather, he can play several direct and 
indirect roles at any one time. The direct roles are implementer, instructor, collaborator, 
processors, information specialist, and supporter. The indirect roles are broker, linkage, 
coordinator, case advocacy, social network builder, consultation provider.  
This case management approach has implications for power relations between 
government agency and VWOs. It serves to enhance division of roles but also sets clear 
responsible parties for performance. When funding is not shared, such as in CARE and 
NVFNS it is inevitable that VWOs and community groups will feel inferior to government. 
However, if the VWOs have strong expertise, they can continue to be play equal roles in the 
partnership. This is the case of SACA in CARE and PAVe in NFVNS.  
Although both use the case management approach, CARE works very tightly with its 
members through a very centralized and dense network as mentioned earlier while NFVNS 
works through a hybrid of a centralized sparse and a decentralized dense network. At the 
center of the NFVNS is the Family Violence Dialogue Group (FVDG) and it works closely with 
six satellite smaller regional networks. This structure, while highly adaptable to ground issues, 
has the possibility of causing confusion in roles and responsibilities. In our interviews, 
interviewees shared with us the early struggles network participants had in managing domestic 
violence cases due to confusion of roles. Thus, there was a need to guide the FVDG and the 
roles partners play through manuals and training sessions following the case management 
25 
 
approach. Compared to CARE, NFVNS has more organic growth in terms of collaboration. 
Also, there are no KPIs imposed on the partners in NFVNS. Despite this, services provided to 
victims of family violence has become more integrated e.g. personnel protection order, 
medical help, schooling for children, and shelter.  
As for REACH, they work through a sparse but highly centralized network with the REACH 
team (medical and administrative staff) being the central member, possessing strong linkages 
with all members. While the schools interact with other members of REACH occasionally for 
certain cases, the bulk of the interaction on mental health issues of children are done with the 
REACH team. Through its helpline as well as periodic visits, REACH maintains contact with 
schools on a close basis. Upon activation of a case, REACH assesses the situation and makes 
the necessary arrangements with the other partners, be it case conferences, arranging for 
other partners to handle, or going down to the schools. REACH also organizes training for 
partners centrally to enhance their partners' knowledge of mental health as well as the 
processes of assessing a child's mental health. A ground manual was thus unnecessary as 
there were very clear ground rules and little confusion on the roles each of the partners play 
given the REACH team’s high level of involvement. We can conclude that REACH is also quite 
centralized with various collaborations with partners at the peripherals.  
In contrast to the above networks, CIB has no specific KPIs for the collaborators aside 
from maintaining and building new gardens. As mentioned in the previous section, most 
groups do not rely on the government for funding. Thus the relationship is more relational than 
contractual. The NParks officers in-charge of the gardens are often considered friends of the 
community members. They freely call each other on their mobiles during and outside of office 
hours. The intention of CIB from the start was to avoid a top-down approach to maintaining 
and growing urban garden spaces. Thus it was not necessary to have KPIs for partners. This 
has allowed CIB to grow organically to over 400 groups without force. This network is thus, 
very loose but yet very resilient. We predict that even if government steps back this network 
will survive and grow. This is because the network does not have a centralized member, relies 
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on co-funding by all organizational members, is voluntary, and driven by passionate volunteers 
who have other full-time jobs.  
Second, the network structure depends also on the target client group. REACH works 
formally and closely with partners that join voluntarily, casting a wide net to detect its real 
target group i.e. mentally challenged children. In CIB, relationships are very informal with only 
verbal agreements between actors. They come with the aims of casting a wide net to change 
the public’s value and behavior towards gardening. As for CARE its target group is very 
specific i.e. ex-offenders, thus the structure is tight. For NFVNS, it has both policy and 
operational goals. At the national-level it aims to cast a wide net. However, at the operational 
level, the net is specifically cast to victims of domestic violence. Thus they have a hybrid 
structure of being tight and loose at the same time, as explained previously.  
Lastly, we observed that the longer the network has existed the more learning and double-
loop learning can occur. Among the four networks, second order learning in REACH, the 
youngest network, was observed to be rather low. While school counsellors and social workers 
were trained by the REACH team on the science and processes of mental health, the 
knowledge gained was largely single looped. There was little indication of double looped 
learning at individual and collective levels with no indication of a change in the partners' goals 
or network structure through participation in the network. For NFVNS, CARE, and to a certain 
extent in CIB, there were several observations and reports of double looped learning. 
 
3) Network Processes 
Communication processes within the network also influence other factors in the network. Each 
of the four networks has slightly differing processes for communication and decision-making. 
Ranking from most centralized to least would be REACH, NVFNS, CARE, and CIB in that 
order. This not only reflects how long the network has existed but it also reflects the network 
structure and actors’ characteristics mentioned above. All four networks have formal meeting 
opportunities with partners. CARE and NVFNS have two levels of meetings, at the directorial 
and the operational level. These meetings serve as channels to bring up operational issues 
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from the ground to the policy level. It also serves for the policy level to be translated down to 
the operational level. Networks that are less formal will find it easier to communicate when 
immediate action is needed. People simply call or email and they can expect to solve the 
problem right away.  
We found that phone calls and emails can only be successful if rapport has already been 
built among actors. Thus it is important to start with face-to-face dialogues. As one network 
member of NVFNS said, “We should start with drinking coffee”. Contrasted to other networks, 
while the working relationships between REACH members have been cordial, it has not turned 
into a close relationship. The main way of contact is mainly through phone and emails with 
occasional visits to schools. Members of REACH do not meet up regularly with everyone in 
the same room (i.e. GPs, schools, VWOs, REACH team). This could be due to how the 
collaborative network is structured and the nature of its work. Thus, the amount of social 
capital is also limited. In sum, networks that have less overall centrality tend to be able to 
create more social capital among partners.  
Lastly, some networks have worked hard to develop ground rules in the form of manuals 
for partners as mentioned. The existence of manuals helped in providing basic understanding 
of standard-operating procedures. Less complex networks, however, rely more on personal 
relationships and trust. Very organic networks like CIB have no manuals at all. This is related 
to the issue of organizational characteristics and the power relations between the government 
agency and the NGO mentioned above.  
IMPLICATION FOR PRACTICE 
Critiques say Singapore’s government is so strong that civil societies have not truly flourished. 
In order to compensate for the lack of strong civil societies the government has set up 
opportunities to strengthen existing organizations by incorporating them into its umbrella of 
social welfare organizations. The government also strategically provides limited amount of 
funding to these organizations hoping that they are not solely reliant on government resources. 
This has proven to be difficult for the VWOs because it is not easy to fund raise in Singapore, 
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where most people see that the government is already providing most of the social services. 
The four networks tell us that Singapore’s government is cautious of being too top-down and 
are looking for innovations from the ground-up. All four networks are government led and serve 
primarily as platforms to coordinate and align services among different agencies. Through the 
process of collaboration with other actors such as schools, hospitals, community groups and 
coproduction with individuals who are experts in the field, the government agencies learn and 
discover adaptive ways to provide public services. The learning processes within the four 
networks also help government agencies to shape its policy preferences that are aligned with 
stakeholders of the policy. 
The Singapore’s cases illustrates that practitioners do and can talk about collaboration, 
coproduction, and networks as managerial processes without stressing the normative 
implications related to public participation, empowerment, rights, citizenry, legitimacy and 
democracy. It is worth noting that there are other VWOs outside of government-led networks. 
But we could not find strong networks that did not have government presence. Ultimately 
Singapore government needs to ask whether they are supporting the networks to enhance 
only managerial effectiveness and provide better services - policy results or is there a higher 
aim to develop the people’s political consciousness - civic results (Bourgon, 2011). If it is the 
former, then Singapore is probably one of the best role model for government-led networks.  
Singapore does not show any shirking of accountability towards policy results as suggested 
by some literature on the downside of coproduction. If it is the latter, then processes, 
structures, and actors of networks will have to be designed very differently. Government will 
have to step back and allow NGOs to truly flourish. 
Singapore’s model is useful for countries that have limited number of civil societies where 
governments wish to be more adaptive and fluid by working in networks rather than 
bureaucracies. By carefully managing relationships with key NGOs and individuals, 
governments can smartly steer policies and responsively serve its people.  Singapore’s case 
demonstrates that network managers should learn to incorporate sets of relationships – 
collaborations and coproduction – into the design of the networks; learn to manage horizontally 
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and not top-down; embrace ground-up innovations; aim to empower partners; and learn to 
communicate at all levels of the network.   
IMPLICATION FOR THEORY 
Empirically we have found that all four networks are made up of relationships between 
organizations and individuals. All four have coproduction schemes with either clients or 
stakeholders. Thus it is important to investigate collaboration and coproduction in the context 
of networks. And it is equally important to investigate network’s components of coproduction 
and collaborations. How do types of coproduction and collaboration affect various dimensions 
of the network (actor behavior, structure, process) and vice versa?  
An analysis of the factors of coproduction without analyzing network variables would lead 
to a reductionist form of understanding. Coproduction, as observed in the four case studies, 
requires trust between co-producers. But trust itself also requires sustainable network 
structures and processes that take into account the stakeholders’ characteristics. While not 
denying that coproduction works better if third sector organizations exist (Brandsen and 
Pestoff, 2006), but we also acknowledge that it is important to understand how the 
coproduction process is positioned in a network. Merely the existence of the third sector is not 
enough. We also cannot simply accept that coproduction works in some sectors while languish 
in others (e.g. Pestoff, 2009). If we want to understand co-production for various purposes 
(e.g. to start, grow, or maintain it), it needs to be understood at a deeper structural level. This 
paper aims to kick-start this process. 
Lastly, this study is based on four networks in Singapore. The framework can be adapted 
to study networks, collaboration, and coproduction in other countries. This would enable us to 
build better theories on the types of desirable relationships in networks. Large-scale 
quantitative studies might help unveil correlations between the all the variables. These are 
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Table 1: Descriptive Comparison of the Networks 
 
 NFVNS CARE CIB REACH 
Year 
started 
1996 2000 2005 2007 
Objectives Help victims of 
family violence  
Help ex-offenders 
to reintegrate  
Build gardening 
groups  
Help children with 
behaviour disorders 















Funding for each 
case comes from 
MCYS (75%)  
 
Funding for each 







minimal funding to 
citizen groups  
Funding provided to 
VWOs and schools 






Number of garden 
groups + qualitative 
indicators 
Quantity and quality 
of cases consulted as 
well as satisfaction 
levels of partners 
Learning  Learning + policy 
change 
Learning  + policy 
change 
Learning by all 
actors  
Learning by VWOs 
and Schools 








Public value change Implementation 
improved, public 

























i Some scholars might argue that we can also categorize co-consultation as a process to co-produce plans. But 
we would like to separate clearly between the process to make a plan and the actual process to implement a plan 
(or program).  
 
ii The 24 networks are Community Safety and Security Programme; REACH network; CARE Network; Eastern 
Health Alliance; Healthier Food Programme; Goodlife! Centre; Singapore Programme for Integrated Care for the 
Elderly (SPICE); Stray cat sterilization programme; Enhanced Step-up; Central Youth Guidance Office (CYGO); 
General Practitioner Empowerment Programme; Singapore National Asthma Programme; National Heath Group 
Partners Shared Care Programmes; MHA community engagement programme; BCA Zero Energy Building; Agri-
Business Cluster; AVA Import Control and Border Inspections; Nparks: Remaking our heartland (Yishun Town); 
Community in Bloom (CIB); SIIA Haze Issue; Dads for Life Programme; National Family Violence Networking 
System; Campaign Against Dengue; and Zero Energy Building.  
 
iii The questions in the simple online survey were: What are your main objectives in joining or forming the 
collaboration?; How much time do you commit to your network?; What do you or your organization provide for the 
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collaboration?; Rate from 1-5 how much your organization’s mission is dependent on what the collaborators do; 
Please list the names of your collaborators in the network; How close are you to them?; Who takes the lead in the 
network?  
 
iv MCYS has been restructured into two ministries, namely Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) and 
Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) in November 2012. We will retain the term MCYS for easy 
reference and accurate representation. 
 
